Borda count

Results: 77



#Item
41Microsoft Word - B132_29-en.docx

Microsoft Word - B132_29-en.docx

Add to Reading List

Source URL: apps.who.int

Language: English - Date: 2013-01-11 10:55:58
42Is Majority Rule the Best Election Method? Eric Maskin SEPTEMBER 2001, PAPER NUMBER 11  The Occasional Papers of the School of Social Science are normally versions of talks given

Is Majority Rule the Best Election Method? Eric Maskin SEPTEMBER 2001, PAPER NUMBER 11 The Occasional Papers of the School of Social Science are normally versions of talks given

Add to Reading List

Source URL: www.sss.ias.edu

Language: English - Date: 2009-08-28 11:36:05
43Review — Elections in split societies median segment, this purpose is likely to impose bounds on a ruling majority’s abuse of power. But of

Review — Elections in split societies median segment, this purpose is likely to impose bounds on a ruling majority’s abuse of power. But of

Add to Reading List

Source URL: www.votingmatters.org.uk

Language: English - Date: 2007-10-26 07:42:25
44Smith  typeset 22:38 18 Nov 2005

Smith typeset 22:38 18 Nov 2005

Add to Reading List

Source URL: www.rangevoting.org

Language: English - Date: 2006-06-02 14:39:04
45MGF[removed]Section 14.2 Flaws of Voting Methods

MGF[removed]Section 14.2 Flaws of Voting Methods

Add to Reading List

Source URL: faculty.nwfsc.edu

Language: English - Date: 2012-01-14 14:01:56
46International Political Science Review (2002), Vol 23, No. 4, 355–372  Social Choice in the South Seas: Electoral

International Political Science Review (2002), Vol 23, No. 4, 355–372 Social Choice in the South Seas: Electoral

Add to Reading List

Source URL: rangevoting.org

Language: English - Date: 2004-04-12 19:58:29
47Majority Judgment Theory and Paradoxical Results Manzoor Ahmad Zahid

Majority Judgment Theory and Paradoxical Results Manzoor Ahmad Zahid

Add to Reading List

Source URL: www2.eco.uva.es

Language: English - Date: 2009-04-17 08:52:16
48WHICH SCORING RULE MAXIMIZES CONDORCET EFFICIENCY? DAVIDE P. CERVONE, WILLIAM V. GEHRLEIN, AND WILLIAM S. ZWICKER

WHICH SCORING RULE MAXIMIZES CONDORCET EFFICIENCY? DAVIDE P. CERVONE, WILLIAM V. GEHRLEIN, AND WILLIAM S. ZWICKER

Add to Reading List

Source URL: www.math.union.edu

Language: English - Date: 2003-07-09 11:19:51
49Safe Votes, Sincere Votes, and Strategizing Eric Pacuit∗

Safe Votes, Sincere Votes, and Strategizing Eric Pacuit∗

Add to Reading List

Source URL: web.cs.gc.cuny.edu

Language: English - Date: 2006-02-23 10:42:13